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Shadow Economy - Is an Enterprise 
Survey a Preferable Approach? 
 
Summary: The direct approaches to measuring the shadow economy have not
been used exten-sively until very recently. A relatively simple method has been
developed (Talis J. Putninš and Arnis Sauka 2015) using an income approach
to measuring GDP and exploiting survey data on unreported employee wages
and the business income generated by enterprises, which was provided by own-
ers/managers of such enterprises. This paper illustrates the advantages of this 
approach over indirect ones through applying it to two EU candidate countries.
This is first done by measuring the size of the shadow economy and then by
providing estimates of the factors which cause enterprises to engage in shadow 
economic activity. Estimates of these factors suggest a number of policy ap-
proaches that could reduce the size of the shadow economy in countries similar
to the ones we have used here.
Key words: Shadow economy, Unreported income, Enterprises and entrepre-
neurs.
JEL: E01, E25, E26.
 
 
 
 
 
 
In spite of decades of research, there is still no consensus among researchers on what 
are the most reliable approaches for measuring a shadow economy. A number of ap-
proaches have been applied. However, many appear unreliable for transition countries, 
as assumptions about the size and stability of parameters in estimating equations are 
often violated due to the unstable economic conditions that prevail in such countries. 
Edgar L. Feige and Ivica Urban (2008) found a huge lack of convergence between 
conventional macro methods for 25 transition countries. In response to these issues, a 
recent paper by Putninš and Sauka (2015) provides a new method for measuring the 
shadow economy using enterprise survey data on unreported personal and business 
income in three Baltic countries.  
The current paper makes a contribution to the research on the shadow economy, 
applying this method for measuring the shadow economy to two EU candidate coun-
tries of south-east Europe (Montenegro and Serbia) and illustrate its advantages over 
more commonly used indirect approaches. It also analyses factors which influence en-
terprise participation in the shadow economy. In this research, the shadow economy is 
defined as the collection of all market-based legal production activities deliberately 
concealed from public authorities (Friedrich Schneider, Andreas Buehn, and Claudio 
E. Montenegro 2010). We estimate the shadow economy of registered enterprises and 
entrepreneurs. 
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 reviews existing methods for esti-
mating shadow economies in south-eastern Europe and the Baltic countries, primarily 
focusing on direct methods. Section 2 details the methodology. Section 3 presents the 
results relating to the size and determinants of the shadow economy providing com-
parisons between Baltic countries on the one hand, and Montenegro and Serbia on the 
other. A final section concludes with some policy implications.  
 
1. Approaches to Measuring the Shadow Economic Activity and 
Understand Factors that Influence the Decision to Engage in It  
 
1.1 Methods Used to Measure the Shadow Economies of South-Eastern 
European and Baltic Countries 
 
Measuring the shadow economies of south-eastern European countries is, for the most 
part, based on indirect methods which are shaped by the knowledge that any participa-
tion in economic activity, whether recorded or unrecorded, leaves a visible trace in 
various areas such as: electricity consumption, the use of cash, the volume of transac-
tions, and labour force participation rates. These methods are most often based on eco-
nomic and other indicators that contain the effects of the shadow economy and relate 
to overall economic activity (recorded and unrecorded), so that the shadow economy 
is measured by subtracting recorded economic activity from overall economic activity.  
Multiple Indicator Multiple Causes (MIMIC) method was widely used to esti- 
mate the shadow economies of central and eastern European countries (see Schneider,  
Buehn, and Montenegro 2010; Vesna Garvanlieva, Vlatko Andonov, and Marjan Ni- 
kolov 2012; Schneider et al. 2015). Figure 1 presents the shadow economies of south- 
ern and eastern Europe in relation to GDP estimated using this method (Schneider  
2013). The highest shadow economy percentage is recorded in Bulgaria (31%) and  
Serbia (30%), while the lowest in the Czech Republic (16%) and Slovakia (15%). 
 
 
 
Notes: For Serbia, estimates relate to 2010. 
Source: Schneider (2013), for Serbia see Schneider et al. (2015). 
 
 
Figure 1  Shadow Economies in Southern and Eastern European Countries as a Percentage of GDP, 
2013 
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Direct approaches have not been used extensively until very recently. They ex-
ploit the micro-level data obtained from the tax audits and surveys or they rely on other 
compliance methods (i.e., the discrepancy between income declared for tax purposes 
and that measured using other data sources). Since tax audits are usually non-random, 
estimates of the shadow economy can be biased if the estimation method does not 
account for this problem. Furthermore, estimates based on tax audits reflect only a part 
of the hidden income which is discovered by authorities, and which is reported by 
registered workers. Edward Christie and Mario Holzner (2004) analyse a range of 
south-eastern European, central and eastern European, and Baltic countries focusing 
on household tax compliance. They derive data on true household income (from final 
consumption data) and statutory tax rates and compare actual tax revenue with what it 
should be if everyone paid the right amount of tax. The gap gives an indication of the 
size of the shadow economy. Authors pointed out that the main limitations of their 
approach are that it only partially captures unreported business income and that not all 
data for producing a more reliable estimate of the statutory household tax rate is avail-
able. Using the same method, Schneider at al. (2015) estimated the shadow economy 
in Serbia at 23.6% of GDP for 2010. 
The other set of direct approaches are based on surveys. Most research so far 
has been based on household surveys (Brugt Kazemier and Rob van Eck 1992; Barry 
Reilly and Gorana Krstić 2003; Jan Hanousek and Filip Palda 2004; European Com-
mission 2007, 2014; Klarita Gerxhani 2007; Southeast European Leadership for De-
velopment and Integrity 2016). Fewer studies still have used enterprise surveys to an-
alyze the characteristics and determinants of businesses engaged in the shadow econ-
omy. There has been research in Bulgaria, the Baltic countries and a study on the im-
pact of the shadow economy on the operation and competitiveness of businesses in 
South Eastern Europe (Collin C. Williams 2006; Lindsay M. Tedds 2010; John Hudson 
et al. 2012; Putninš and Sauka 2012, 2015). However, to our knowledge, only a few 
studies have used enterprise surveys in order to estimate the shadow economy. 
Putninš and Sauka (2012, 2015, 2016) developed simple method to measure the 
shadow economy in Baltic countries, which is based on the income approach to meas-
uring the GDP and the survey data on unreported employee wages and the business 
income provided by owners/managers of surveyed enterprises. The authors estimated 
that the shadow economy was largest in Latvia (21.3% of GDP in 2015), while in 
Estonia and Lithuania shadow economies were around 15% of GDP. All three coun-
tries have experienced a contraction in the relative size of their shadow economies 
since 2009, with the most dramatic decline being experienced by Latvia. This method 
will be further explained in the methodology section below.  
A broadly similar approach was used to obtain macro-level estimate of Serbia’s 
shadow economy (Schneider at al. 2015). Using the data derived from the enterprises 
and entrepreneurs survey, two most significant forms of the shadow economy (i.e., 
unreported employee wages and unreported sales) are estimated. A study for Kosovo 
(Reinvest Institute 2013) shows that business owners and managers believe that, on 
average, businesses in their industry do not report around 39 percent of sales, while 
37% of total employed in their actual business is unreported based on the data obtained 
from the survey of registered businesses in Kosovo. The Center for the Study of 
 592 Barry Reilly and Gorana Krstić 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2019, Vol. 66, Issue 5, pp. 589-610 
Democracy (2016) in Bulgaria, using data derived from the enterprises survey, devel-
oped a Business Hidden Economy Index which includes several components: hidden 
economy size (subjective perceptions of business representatives about the size of the 
hidden economy in the country as a whole, and in their sector), hidden employment, 
hidden turnover, and hidden redistribution. 
Although the application of the enterprise survey approach is very costly and 
are more time consuming than indirect methods, they eliminate many of the drawbacks 
of indirect methods. First, it can easily be applied to transition countries where most 
indirect methods do not provide reliable estimates of the shadow economy, given that 
they rely on many assumptions which appear unrealistic. Second, the comparability of 
shadow economy between countries and over time can be achieved using a set of stand-
ardized survey questions for measuring the shadow economic activity as our empirical 
results reveal. This can be very useful for the design and evaluation of policy measures 
to reduce the shadow economy over time. Third, this method provides data on the 
structure of the shadow economy (across sectors, regions and other characteristics of 
the entities that perform them) and the determinants of an enterprise’s involvement in 
the shadow economy, which can be useful for policy-makers. Fourth, estimates of the 
shadow economy can be available even prior to the calculation of GDP for the year the 
survey was conducted. We illustrate these advantages applying this method to two Eu-
ropean Union (EU) candidate countries. 
It is argued that the greatest limitation of these direct methods is that they may 
underestimate the shadow economy as a result of partial or complete concealment of 
these activities by respondents. We use responses from the owners/managers of sur-
veyed enterprises, as they are “in the unique position of simultaneously knowing about 
both shadow economy components – unreported wages and unreported business prof-
its” (Putninš and Sauka 2015). To obtain more truthful responses, we use the “indirect” 
approach for questions about these components of shadow economy, asking own-
ers/managers about “enterprises in their industry” rather than “their enterprise”. This 
is because the need to conceal data associated with other enterprises is much smaller 
compared to the need to conceal data on one’s own enterprise activity, which is further 
described in Section 1.2 and in Section 2.2. 
We do not estimate income from production of illegal goods and services as it 
is not covered by our definition of the shadow economy. Shadow economic activities 
related to households are partly captured, since the survey covered registered entrepre-
neurs who belong to the household sector. 
A critical evaluation of the various estimates and calibration methods can be 
found in the studies conducted by Schneider (2005, 2010, 2011), Lars P. Feld and 
Schneider (2010), Putninš and Sauka (2015) and Schneider and Buehn (2016). 
 
1.2 Approaches to Understand Factors that Influence the Decision to Engage in 
Shadow Economic Activity  
 
The literature germane to tax evasion commonly identifies two groups of factors that 
influence the decision to engage in shadow economic activity. The first group of fac-
tors is based on rational choice models (e.g., Michael G. Allingham and Agnar Sandmo 
1972; Shlomo Yitzhaki 1974). Entrepreneurs weigh the expected benefits and costs 
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associated with tax evasion and involvement in the shadow economy (i.e., they com-
pare the actual benefits from tax evasion and the corresponding costs, should they be 
caught). The expected costs depend on the probability of detection, the rate and type 
of penalty, the probability of enforcement, and their propensity to take risks. 
However, empirical studies reveal that the real level of tax evasion is consider-
ably lower in comparison to the predictions of rational choice theory. This is due to 
the existence of other psychological and social groups of factors relating to attitudes 
towards tax evasion, the shadow economy and social norms (e.g., Alan Lewis 1982). 
These include the perceived fairness of the taxation system, that is, attitudes on 
whether or not the tax burden and tax processes are just.  
In our econometric analysis, we examine the probability that those caught will 
be penalised and also to what extent involvement in the shadow economy is dependent 
upon social norms (i.e., moral values).  
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Enterprise Survey Approach 
 
We have followed the methodology suggested by Putninš and Sauka (2015). This is 
based on an income approach to measuring GDP and exploits data from the enterprise 
survey regarding both unreported personal incomes and business incomes. According 
to the income method, GDP is defined as the sum of gross remuneration of employees 
and the gross business income of enterprises (profits). Thus, the shadow economy can 
be estimated as the sum of unreported remuneration of employees and unreported busi-
ness incomes.  
The underreporting of employee remuneration includes underreporting salaries, 
or “envelope wages” (URsi) and unregistered employees (URei) whose total salaries 
are paid in cash. It is assumed that the wages of the unregistered employees are, on 
average, equal to the wages of registered employees. By taking both components into 
consideration, the total unreported proportion of employee remuneration of enterprise 
i (UReri) is: 
 
UReri = 1 − (1 − URsi)(1 − URei). (1)
 
The weighted average of underreported personal incomes and underreported 
business income (URbi) for each enterprise represents an estimate of the unreported or 
shadow proportion of an enterprise’s production (income): 
 
ShadowProportioni = αUReri + (1 − α)URbii, (2)
 
where α is the ratio of employee remuneration to the sum of employees’ remuneration 
and gross business income of enterprises, based on the income approach to measuring 
GDP. We applied the weighted average of the underreporting values instead of a sim-
ple average in order to interpret the index of the shadow economy as a proportion of 
GDP.  
Finally, the index of the shadow economy for a country is defined as a weighted 
average of the underreported production (ShadowProportioni) of enterprises in the rep-
resentative sample of enterprises.  
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INDEXse = ∑ 𝑤𝑖ே௜ୀଵ  ShadowProportioni. (3)
 
The weights wi represent the relative contribution of each enterprise to GDP in 
the country, which is approximated by the proportion of total wages paid by the enter-
prise to the total wages of all enterprises in the representative sample. This weighting 
procedure ensures the index of the shadow economy reflects a proportion of GDP. For 
example, suppose only two enterprises exist in an economy: a large one which pro-
duces income of 70 and a smaller one that produces income of 30, comprising true 
GDP of 100. Suppose that income of a large enterprise is underreported by 10% and 
of a smaller one by 40%, giving the official GDP of 81 and the shadow economy of 
19%. In order to obtain correct estimate of the shadow economy, we used the weighted 
average of underreported production of the two firms: 0.7*(10%) + (1 − 0.7)*(40%) = 
19%. Weights are approximated by the relative amount of total wages paid by each 
enterprise. Using unweighted average of the unreported production of all enterprises 
would not provide accurate results (i.e., in this example it would give a shadow econ-
omy figure of 25% of GDP). In this way, we take into account both the size of the 
shadow economy in each enterprise as enterprises in some sectors (for example con-
struction and services) may have large underreported incomes relative to other enter-
prises (for example, building machineries), and the relative contribution of each enter-
prise to GDP.  
 
2.2 Survey Design 
 
The shadow economy is estimated using the data drawn from enterprise and entrepre-
neur survey, given that the managers or owners of those enterprises surveyed are most 
familiar with these activities. The survey allows us to explore the shadow economy 
from a business perspective, as almost all previous research in these countries has been 
based on household-level surveys. The survey was designed to elicit information nec-
essary to measure the shadow economy by assessing the main types of shadow activi-
ties undertaken based on owners/managers’ responses.  
The survey was conducted on a representative sample of 409 business entities 
(enterprises and entrepreneurs) in Montenegro covering the period November-Decem-
ber 2014, and 1,251 business entities in Serbia between 16 and 22 October 2012. Most 
of the respondents were either owners or managers of business entities or entrepre-
neurs. The data were collected using face-to-face interviews.  
The surveys were conducted using a single-stage stratified sample of business 
entities. The sampling frame was based on the list of all active business entities (enter-
prises and entrepreneurs) registered with the Central Registry of Business Entities. The 
stratification was based on regions, sectors of economic activity and the size of the 
entity based on the number of employees. The total sample was allocated by stratum 
in proportion to the size of each stratum in the initial sample. A simple random sample 
was used with replacement by stratum. The data are representative at the national level 
and by region, sector of economic activity and entity size (viz., micro, small, medium 
and large comprising one group).  
In order to reduce the effects on the survey findings of concealing irregular 
business activities, the contents of the survey questions, their sequencing and 
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formulation as well as the approach of the survey have been tested in a pilot study and 
subsequently adjusted so as to exert minimum influence on respondent bias. Various 
techniques have been used in previous studies and have proven to be useful in deliv-
ering the most honest responses possible (e.g., Kazemier and van Eck 1992; Reilly and 
Krstić 2003; Hanousek and Palda 2004; Gerxhani 2007). This implies, among other 
things, that the respondents are gradually led towards questions of a more sensitive 
nature, where the preceding question is usually less sensitive than subsequent ones.  
In addition to questions relating to the involvement of the surveyed enterprise 
in various forms of the shadow economy, there are questions on the subjective attitude 
of the enterprise owner/manager on the involvement of other enterprises operating in 
the same industry in such activities. This approach is described as a method used to 
obtain truthful responses (Gerxhani 2007) and is used in the research undertaken by 
Hanousek and Palda (2004), Sauka (2008), Putninš and Sauka (2012) and Krstić 
(2015). For the most important forms of the shadow economy, the same subjective 
questions were asked of enterprise owners/managers regarding their involvement in 
the shadow economy as well as the involvement of other enterprises in the same in-
dustry in such activities. The research conducted by Sauka (2008) and Krstić (2015) 
revealed that even when the questions are posed indirectly, the answers of the own-
ers/managers still relate to the enterprises they represent. 
The survey questionnaire consists of four modules. The first is devoted to gen-
eral information about the enterprise such as, for example, its type, employment size, 
ownership structure, date of establishment, sector of economic activity, sales turnover, 
and position relative to its competitors. The second module is designed to capture data 
on the activities of each enterprise in various types of shadow economic activity. In 
addition, the enterprise owners/managers are expected to present their subjective views 
on the involvement of other enterprises from the same industry in the shadow econ-
omy. They are asked to estimate the amount of underreporting of employees, employee 
wages and business income (profits) that their own enterprise is involved in, as well as 
to make those estimates for other enterprises in the same industry. The third module 
relates to owner/manager perceptions regarding the main causes and incentives for 
various types of informal activities, their attitudes regarding the performance of tax 
and inspection authorities, and the ability of inspections to tackle the shadow economy. 
This section also elicits perceptions of the likelihood of being caught if engaged in 
informal activities and of being penalised, if caught. The final module of the survey 
covers policy proposals for the reduction of the shadow economy. 
In Montenegro, underreporting of business income (or profits) of enterprise i 
(URoii) is estimated using the survey question regarding the business income of enter-
prises in the same industry (see question Q1 in the Appendix). The underreporting of 
employee remuneration from Equation (1) is estimated using the survey question re-
garding the underreporting of salaries in the same industry, or “envelope wages” (ques-
tion Q2 in the Appendix) and unregistered employees (URei) whose total salaries are 
paid in cash (question Q3 in the Appendix). In Serbia, the survey did not collect infor-
mation on unreported business income, so that shadow economy is estimated based on 
unreported employee remuneration for the enterprises in the same industry (see ques-
tion Q7 in the Appendix). 
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2.3 Factors that Influence the Level of Involvement in the Shadow Economy 
 
In order to examine the factors that influence an enterprise’s involvement in the 
shadow economy, we specify the following linear regression model: 
 
Yi = ∝ +𝛽′𝑋i + ei, (4)
 
where Yi is the unreported proportion of production of enterprise i for Montenegro (or 
unreported proportion of employee remuneration for Serbia); Xi is a k x 1 vector of 
characteristics of enterprise i (e.g., legal form, employment size, age of the enterprise, 
turnover, the average wage paid by the enterprise, sector of economic activity, region, 
perceptions and attitudes of the owners/managers regarding involvement in the shadow 
economy etc.); 𝛽 is a k x 1 vector of unknown equation parameters to be estimated; ∝ 
is a constant term; ei is an error term for which standard assumptions are made. The 
model (4) is estimated by OLS. Given the presence of heteroscedasticity, robust stand-
ard errors are used for purposes of inference.  
 
3. Empirical Results: Baltic Countries vs Montenegro and Serbia 
 
3.1 Estimate of the Shadow Economy  
 
We applied the method described above to Montenegro and Serbia and compared the 
results with the Baltic countries. For Montenegro, the coefficient α from Equation (2), 
which represents the ratio of employee remuneration and the sum of employee remu-
neration and the gross business income of enterprises is calculated as the average for 
eastern European countries for 2013 (Eurostat 2016)1, given Montenegro’s GDP is not 
calculated using the income approach, but rather using the production and expenditure 
approaches2. The shadow economy index obtained from Equation (3) relates to the 
economic activity of three sectors included in the enterprises survey. In addition to 
non-financial and financial enterprises, the survey covered entrepreneurs who belong 
to the household sector. The general government sector was not included. As a result, 
the size of the shadow economy in Montenegro, as a percentage of GDP, is calculated 
by multiplying the index (i.e., rates) of the shadow economy (from Equation (3)), 
which is 30.1 percent by the share of gross value added of these three sectors in total 
gross value added, amounting to 81.4 percent (Statistical Office of Montenegro 2013). 
Therefore, Montenegro’s shadow economy was estimated to be about 24.5 percent of 
GDP in 2014.  
For Serbia, we estimate one component of the shadow economy (i.e., the unre-
ported proportion of employee remuneration, based on underreporting of salaries and 
unregistered employees). Since the survey covered the three institutional sectors, as in 
the case of Montenegro, the unreported proportion of employee remuneration (amount-
ing for a share of 0.438) is first multiplied by the share of employee remuneration of 
the three sectors in the total employee remuneration (0.70). Finally, in order to estimate 
shadow economy as a proportion of GDP, the overall unreported proportion of em-
ployee remuneration is multiplied by the ratio of employee remuneration and the sum 
 
1 Eurostat. 2016. Database. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (accessed May 18, 2016). 
2 Data obtained for Serbia and Macedonia is for 2012. Ukraine was not included. 
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of employee remuneration and the gross business income in Serbia (0.516). Thus, the 
Serbian shadow economy, based on unreported employee remuneration, is estimated 
at 15.8 percent of GDP in 2012. 
Table 1 reports the size of the shadow economies for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,  
Montenegro in 2014 and Serbia in 2012 using the shadow economy index method. The  
shadow economy of Montenegro (as a percentage of GDP) is slightly higher than that  
of Latvia which has the highest shadow economy among Baltic countries. It should be  
borne in mind that estimates of the shadow economies of Montenegro (and Serbia)  
relate to all sectors, while the shadow economy estimates for the Baltic countries are  
based on the private sector alone. Table 1 also reveals that the Serbian shadow econ- 
omy based on its one component (unreported proportion of employee remuneration) is  
even higher than the overall shadow economy of Estonia and Lithuania. In addition to  
unreported employee remuneration, if unreported sales is estimated (as a percent of  
GDP) based on the same enterprise survey from 2012 (Schneider et al. 2015), the  
shadow economy in Serbia appears to be 27.4 percent. This estimate is slightly higher  
as compared to estimate from other direct method applied for Serbia (i.e., Household  
Tax Compliance Approach - HTC). According to HTC approach, the shadow economy  
in Serbia was 23.6 percent in 2010 (Schneider et al. 2015). Our estimate for Montene- 
gro cannot be compared with other studies, given that the last estimate for the shadow  
economy was conducted in 2005 (United Nations Development Programme 2016). 
 
Table 1  Estimates of the Shadow Economies in Baltic Countries, Montenegro and Serbia  
by Enterprises Survey Approach 
 
 Method Coverage Year Shadow economy in % of GDP 
Estonia Shadow economy index Private sector 2014 13.2 
Latvia Shadow economy index Private sector 2014 23.5 
Lithuania Shadow economy index Private sector 2014 12.5 
Montenegro Shadow economy index All sectors 2014 24.5 
Serbia Shadow economy index  
Direct method 
Unreported personal income 
Unreported personal income + unreported sales 
2012 
2012
15.8 
27.4 
 
Source: Own estimates for Montenegro based on 2014 enterprise survey; estimates for Serbia 
based on 2012 enterprise survey according to Schneider et al. (2015); for Estonia, Latvia and  
Lithuania according to Putninš and Sauka (2016). 
 
In addition, it is important to emphasize that the estimate does not show by what  
percentage it is necessary to increase GDP in order to include the shadow economy,  
because a certain part of the shadow economy is already included in the calculation of  
GDP (Statistical Office of Montenegro 2013). However, the advantage of this ap- 
proach is in the fact that the shadow economy which is included in the estimate, is  
known and is the unreported incomes of registered enterprises and entrepreneurs.  
Therefore, this method may be used to adjust GDP for the part of the shadow economy  
not included in its calculation (Putninš and Sauka 2015) under the assumption that the  
part of the non-observed economy included in the registered GDP is actually known. 
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3.2 Components of the Shadow Economy  
 
We believe that our estimates of the shadow economy, do not represent a lower bound 
of the phenomenon, as we use questions relating to other enterprises operating in the 
same sector, instead of questions relating to the enterprises of the owners/managers. 
This is because the need to conceal data associated with other enterprises is negligible 
compared to the need to conceal data on one’s own enterprise activity (as Table 2 
reports). It is evident that all forms of the shadow economy are significantly higher 
when it comes to other enterprises operating in the same sector. The proportion of 
unregistered employees ranges from 4.7 to 16.4 percent in Montenegro and from 1.9 
to 23.9 percent in Serbia. The unreported proportion of wages ranges from 34.1 to 42.7 
percent in Montenegro, while the upper bound is 26.2 percent in Serbia. Based on the 
questions relating to other enterprises in the same sector, it appears that the total unre-
ported proportion of employee remuneration (UReri) is higher in Montenegro than in 
Serbia. Regarding the second component of the shadow economy, in both countries 
the respondents were not asked the question on the percentage of unreported business 
income in their own enterprise, since this indicator is highly sensitive, and only in 
Montenegro is it asked about other enterprises within the same sector.  
 
Table 2  Components of the Shadow Economy of Owners/Managers’ Own Enterprises and those  
Operating in the same Sector Based on Enterprise Surveys, Montenegro and Serbia 
 
 Montenegro, 2014 Serbia, 2012 
 Own  
enterprise
Enterprises in  
the same sector
Own 
enterprise
Enterprises in 
the same sector 
% of unregistered employees 4.7 16.4 1.9 23.9 
% of employees with envelope wages 10.7 22.8 3.8 24.7 
% of unreported wages 34.1 42.7 … 26.2 
 
Notes: Only a third of the respondents answered the question on unreported wages relating to their respective enterprise, 
and this question was not asked in Serbia due to its sensitivity. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the enterprises and entrepreneurs surveys in Montenegro and Serbia.  
 
 
 
Source: For Montenegro own calculations based on 2014 survey of enterprises and 
entrepreneurs; for Baltic countries according to Putninš and Sauka (2015). 
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Figure 2 presents the relative size of components of the shadow economy in the 
Baltic countries and in Montenegro. Unreported employee wages, or the partial or total 
payment of wages in cash (in the case of unregistered employees), comprise a larger 
proportion of the shadow economy than the unreported income of enterprises. In Mon-
tenegro, unreported employee wages account for 62.1 percent, while in the Baltic 
countries they range from 54.5 percent in Latvia to 78.9 percent in Estonia.  
 
3.3 Attitudes Towards Tax Evasion and Shadow Economic Activity 
 
The factors influencing the degree of involvement in the shadow economy will be an-
alysed in the next section, and we now discuss the characteristics of certain variables 
to be used in the empirical model. 
Empirical research suggests that the probability of detection plays a very im-
portant role in explaining the causes of tax evasion. According to the results of the 
enterprises survey, the estimated probability of detecting enterprises involved in infor-
mal activities is not very high in Montenegro. Only 17 percent of the respondents re-
ported that the probability of detection is between 80 and 100 percent. However, the 
probability of being penalised if caught is much higher, given that 44 percent of re-
spondents perceived an 80-100 percent probability of being penalized (Figure 3). Fi-
nally, 47 percent of the respondents perceived an 80-100 percent probability that the 
penalty would be paid. Therefore, the expectation that those caught will be penalised 
and that this penalty will be paid has resulted in a small overall probability.  
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the survey of enterprises and entrepreneurs in Montenegro. 
 
 
Figure 3  Probability of Being Penalised, Montenegro 2014 and Serbia 2012 
 
In the case of Serbia, these probabilities are even lower. While the same pro-
portion of respondents as in Montenegro reported that the probability of detection is 
between 80 and 100 percent (16.5 percent), the probability of being penalised if caught 
and the probability that the penalty would be paid is significantly lower (19 and 18 
percent, respectively). This is why a significant share of enterprises continue to engage 
in informal business activities, even after being penalised (58 percent in Montenegro 
and around two-thirds in Serbia).  
These expectations encourage an enterprise to become involved in the shadow 
economy because they significantly reduce expected costs. However, in our 
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econometric analysis, we focus only on the concept of expectation such that those 
caught will be penalised (see question Q4 in the Appendix). 
The analysis also examines attitudes towards the shadow economy alone ac-
cording to the beliefs of the enterprises’ owners/managers alone (see question Q5 in 
the Appendix). This factor may correlate with untruthful responses. However, it is our 
belief that it is still a relevant indicator of the readiness of enterprises operating in an 
environment where sanctions are implausible, to choose whether to become involved 
(or not) in the shadow economy. According to the results of the survey, 81 percent of 
enterprises in Montenegro and 71 percent in Serbia believe that there is no excuse for 
this kind of behaviour, while 16 percent in Montenegro feel that it is justified and 9 
percent in Serbia. This indicates that a number of enterprises involved in the shadow 
economy specifically claim that this type of business is unjustified, suggesting they 
were not entirely truthful in the survey responses provided.  
 
3.4 Determinants of the Level of Involvement in the Shadow Economy  
 
We now investigate the role of some key factors that influence an enterprise’s involve-
ment in the shadow economy. Table 3 reports OLS estimates for the unreported pro-
portion of an enterprise’s production, defined above, on various determinants of 
shadow activity using data drawn from the sample of Montenegrin enterprises. We 
also estimated an unreported proportion of employee remuneration for Serbia, since 
the Serbian enterprises survey, as already noted, did not collect information on the 
unreported proportion of business profits.  
The explanatory variables are divided into five groups. The first consists of en-
terprise characteristics – whether they be enterprises or entrepreneurs, VAT payers or 
non-VAT payers, foreign or domestic equity, a business entity registered from the very 
start of the business or not (dummy variables), as well as the size of the enterprise in 
terms of the number of employees, the age of the enterprise and the average wage (all 
in natural log values). The variable relating to ownership sector was not included given 
that 99 percent of the surveyed enterprises are privately owned in Montenegro, while 
the figure is 97 percent in Serbia. The second group comprises dummy variables for 
the sector of economic activity. The third group is comprised of variables relating to 
the operations of the enterprise – annual turnover (interval values in € for Montenegro; 
a continuous variable for Serbia expressed in natural log values), changes in the total 
sales income in the reference year as compared to the previous year (stable, increased 
or decreased), so that we can determine whether or not the economic deterioration of 
the enterprise’s position exerts an impact on the scale of its involvement in the shadow 
economy (dummy variable). The fourth group consists of dummy variables for the 
expectations/attitudes of the surveyed enterprises regarding the probability of facing 
sanctions, as defined in the previous section (response to question Q4 with higher 
scores indicating higher probability that those caught will be penalised), and social 
norms measured by the extent to which shadow activity is justified behaviour (re-
sponse to question Q5, with higher scores indicating more justified behaviour). The 
fifth and final group consists of regional dummy variables.  
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Table 3  Determinants of Enterprises’ Level of Involvement in Shadow Economy in Montenegro and 
Serbia 
 
 Montenegro Serbia
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Entrepreneur -0.035 -0.032 -0.050 -0.047 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035) 
Non-VAT 0.120* 0.112* 0.120*** 0.117*** 
payer (0.061) (0.061) (0.039) (0.039) 
Foreign -0.063 -0.068 -0.134** -0.133** 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.060) 
Ln(employees) 0.013 0.015 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) 
Ln(age)  0.038** 0.037** -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) 
Registered  -0.074 -0.089* -0.087 -0.090 
when established (0.049) (0.046) (0.057) (0.057) 
Ln(wage) 0.003 0.004 -0.038 -0.039 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.025) (0.025) 
 
Sector of economic activity 
Agriculture 0.025 0.020 0.129 0.119 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.098) (0.096) 
Construction 0.047 0.048 0.185*** 0.181*** 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.053) (0.053) 
Trade 0.050 0.053 -0.015 -0.016 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) 
Tourism 0.002 0.009 0.038 0.035 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.056) (0.057) 
Other services -0.015 -0.007 0.093 0.092 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.065) (0.065) 
 
Turnover, in € 
50,001-100,000 -0.053 -0.051 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.011) (0.011) 
100,001-500,000 -0.108*** -0.105***  
 (0.039) (0.039)  
500,001& over -0.131*** -0.122**  
 (0.050) (0.048)  
 
Sales revenue change 
Stable 0.008 0.010 0.057 0.055 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.037) (0.037) 
Increased 0.046 0.043 0.015 0.011 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.040) (0.039) 
 
Attitudes  
Penalty for  -0.036 -0.037 -0.122*** -0.131*** 
detection (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Justification  0.031** 0.030** 0.041*** 0.042*** 
for shadow act. (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Region 
Region 1 0.044 0.031  
 (0.050) (0.046)  
Region 2 0.028 0.036  
 (0.048) (0.031)  
Constant 0.248 0.285 0.883*** 0.942*** 
 (0.229) (0.219) (0.287) (0.289) 
N 298 298 446 446 
Adjusted R2 0.119 0.121 0.136 0.137 
F test 2.99 3.17 6.45 7.31 
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: For Montenegro, dependent variable is enterprises’ unreported proportion of production; for Serbia it is enterprises’ 
unreported proportion of employee remuneration. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
For Montenegro: Region 1 is Center; Region 2 is South; for Serbia: Region 1 is Belgrade; Region 2 is Central Serbia. Refer-
ence categories: enterprise, VAT payer, domestically owned, business entity not registered when started to work, industry, 
turnover lower than €50,000 for Montenegro (for Serbia it is continuous variable), sales revenue decreased, increase penal-
ties, Northern region for Montenegro, Vojvodina for Serbia.  
 
Source: Own estimates based on the enterprises surveys in Montenegro and in Serbia. 
 
 602 Barry Reilly and Gorana Krstić 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2019, Vol. 66, Issue 5, pp. 589-610 
We started with Model 1 which includes all of the factors described above test- 
ing their significance. Model 2 excludes regional dummies which are not statistically  
significant but retains sector dummies and the variable relating to the penalty for de- 
tection which are viewed as important control variables. We will now focus our atten- 
tion on Model 2 for each country (without regional dummies) given that it explains  
most of the variation in the dependent variable.  
On the basis of the main characteristics of enterprises, the estimated coefficient  
of the non-VAT payers is statistically significant at the 10% significance level in Mon- 
tenegro and at the 1% level in Serbia and both have the expected positive sign. Non- 
VAT payers appear to be more involved in shadow activities in Montenegro and Ser- 
bia, controlling for other explanatory factors. The estimated effect for enterprises with  
foreign equity is statistically significant at the 5% significance level in Serbia and has  
the expected negative sign, while this effect is not found to be statistically significant  
in Montenegro. Enterprises with foreign equity in Serbia are less likely to be engaged  
in the underreporting of wages. The estimated coefficient corresponding to older en- 
terprises is statistically significant at the 5% significance level in Montenegro and  
again both have unexpected positive sign, while it is insignificant in Serbia. The results  
for Montenegro suggest that older enterprises increase their competitiveness against  
younger enterprises using unregistered employees, providing “envelope wages” or un- 
derreporting their profits. This unexpected result may be explained by the fact that the  
shadow economy was largely tolerated by the state, especially during the 1990s, and  
subsequently became deeply rooted in enterprise behaviour both in Montenegro and in  
Serbia.  
The estimated effect corresponding to the registration of enterprises at the very  
start of their business is statistically significant at the 10% significance level in Mon- 
tenegro and has the expected negative sign, while it is statistically insignificant in Ser- 
bia. Montenegrin enterprises that formally registered at the very start of their business  
are less likely to become involved in the shadow economy by 8.9 percentage points  
relative to those that failed to register. This suggests that this variable can be used as a  
proxy for the formal business practices of enterprises. Thus, reforms may focus on  
removing such barriers to entry. This finding indicates the existence of a cycle in which  
informal employees find themselves, and one that is difficult to escape from, due to  
the fact that their knowledge and skills become obsolete. In the long-term, this has a  
negative effect on the probability of finding better employment in the formal sector.  
Other characteristics of enterprises, such as their legal form (entrepreneur or  
enterprise), employment size, the average wage paid by the enterprise and changes in  
sales revenues are not found to be statistically significant in both countries. 
The estimated effects corresponding to the set of industry sector dummy varia- 
bles are also not found to be statistically significant (except for the construction sector  
in the regression model for Serbia, which is significant at the 1% level). In other words,  
sectoral differences in participating in the shadow economy are neutralised when the  
impact of the other characteristics of the enterprises are included in the model, such as  
their employment size, age, and enterprise type. This finding is consistent with the  
results of the determinants of participation in shadow economic activity in Serbia  
(Krstić and Branko Radulović 2015) and may indicate a need to formulate specific  
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measures in order to formalise the shadow economy, which should be largely sector- 
neutral. 
Among the third group of factors relating to business practices, the estimated 
coefficients of the turnover dummy is highly statistically significant (at the 1% level) 
in Montenegro and have the expected negative signs, while the estimated effect corre-
sponding to the continuous variable in Serbia is found to be statistically insignificant. 
Montenegrin enterprises with a higher turnover are less involved in underreporting the 
number of employees, wages and profits. Enterprises with a turnover between 
€100,001-€500,000 and €500,001 or more, were ceteris paribus less involved in the 
shadow economy by 10 and 12 percentage points respectively, relative to those enter-
prises with turnovers lower than €50,000. This indicates that an enterprise’s economic 
performance is a significant determinant of its level of involvement in the shadow 
economy in Montenegro. 
Finally, we analyse the estimated effects for the fourth group of variables in 
more depth (i.e., the perceptions and attitudes of the owners/managers regarding in-
volvement in the shadow economy). We acknowledge that there is a potential endoge-
neity problem in regard to the attitude/perception variables included in the reported 
specifications. This follows from the fact that the unobservables determining these at-
titudes/perceptions may be correlated with the unobservables determining the extent 
of informal activity. If they are positively correlated, this may induce an upward bias 
in the estimated OLS effect, so some degree of caution is required in the interpretation 
of these effects. However, the absence of any instruments in the current dataset pre-
vents a meaningful interrogation of this issue in the current application. 
The probability of being penalised if caught yield a highly statistically signifi- 
cant effect for Serbia (but not Montenegro) and suggests that the higher the perceived  
probability of being penalised if detected, the lower the level of tax evasion and un- 
derreporting of wages, which is in line with the predictions of rational choice models  
and may also reflect the relative strength of governance and enforcement in Serbia  
compared to Montenegro. This result is consistent with findings for the Baltic coun- 
tries (Putninš and Sauka 2015), which suggest that one policy option in reducing the  
shadow economy is to increase the probability of detection, and being penalised if  
detected, through increasing tax audits and other similar measures.  
The estimated effects corresponding to the attitudes of Montenegrin and Serbian  
owners/managers regarding their justification for involvement in the shadow economy  
are statistically significant (at the 5% significance level in Montenegro and at the 1%  
level in Serbia). In addition, they both have a theoretically expected positive sign. They  
indicate that those that think that engagement in the shadow economy is more justified  
tend to be more often involved in it, which is consistent with theory. Low tax morality  
is usually animated by a low level of trust in governmental institutions, their fairness  
and efficiency, as well as by the government’s high degree of tolerance of the shadow  
economy. This result is redolent of findings for the shadow economy reported for Ser- 
bia (Krstić and Radulović 2015) and the Baltic countries (Putninš and Sauka 2015).  
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4. Conclusions 
 
This paper has attempted to identify the importance of the shadow economy in two  
non-EU countries by measuring its size and providing evidence on the main factors  
that influence an enterprise’s level of involvement in the shadow economy. The avail- 
ability high-quality survey data from enterprises and entrepreneurs in conjunction with  
a new method of measuring the shadow economy (see Putninš and Sauka 2015) per- 
mits us to draw a number of important conclusions regarding the nature of the shadow  
economy in these countries. We also illustrated some advantages of this method for  
measuring the shadow economy over more commonly used indirect approaches. 
Our results revealed that a significant share of the overall economy in Monte- 
negro and in Serbia was generated in the shadow economy and was estimated to be  
equivalent to around a quarter of their official GDP. As compared to Baltic countries,  
the shadow economy of Montenegro and Serbia based on their one component (i.e.,  
unreported proportion of employee remuneration) is even higher than the overall  
shadow economy of Estonia and Lithuania. In terms of structure, almost two-thirds of  
the Montenegrin shadow economy referred to unreported wages and around one-third  
to unreported business income (or profits). This result emphasizes the key priorities  
for policymakers, as the majority of the shadow economy appears related to unreported  
employees and their wages (either unreported in full or partially).  
Furthermore, our results reveal that the estimates of the shadow economy based  
on this approach do not understate the level of shadow economic activity, as they  
would have if we had used questions on the shadow economy about the enterprises of  
the owners/managers. We find that all forms of the shadow economy are significantly  
higher when it comes to other enterprises operating in the same sector.  
Our estimates for the determinants of an enterprise’s involvement in the shadow  
economy indicate a number of policy approaches that may reduce the size of the  
shadow economy in two non-EU member states and countries similar to these ones.  
The findings revealed that enterprises that registered right from their inception as a  
business are less likely to subsequently become involved in the shadow economy.  
Thus, reforms may focus on removing barriers to entry. A second result of interest is  
that the estimated effects for the industry sectoral dummy variables are not statistically  
significant. This may indicate a need to develop specific measures for the formalisation  
of the shadow economy which need to be, for the most part, sector-neutral. Thirdly, an  
enterprise’s economic performance is a significant determinant of its level of involve- 
ment in the shadow economy, indicating that enterprises with higher turnover are less  
involved in underreporting of employees, wages and profits. This suggests that as the  
economy becomes more buoyant, the level of shadow economic activity will decline.  
Fourth, the results also suggests that the higher the perceived probability of being pe- 
nalised if detected, the lower is the level of tax evasion and underreporting of wages,  
which indicate that one policy option in reducing the shadow economy is to increase  
the probability of being penalised through increasing tax audits and other similar sur 
veillance measures.  
Finally, our analysis identifies those owners/managers who are able to provide  
more reasons to justify informal business to be more involved in the shadow economy.  
This result suggests that one of the priorities in reducing the shadow economy is to  
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focus on increasing the extent of tax morality (i.e., the civic sense that paying taxes is  
the moral thing to do) and institutional quality. This could be addressed by outreach  
campaigns with the objective of increasing the awareness of the public on the negative  
effects of the shadow economy, to inform the public of the value of public services,  
and also by improving the quality of these services. If the government is consistent and  
unselective in tackling tax evasion, taxpayers will be more certain that other taxpayers  
will pay and, therefore, they themselves will be more willing to pay. 
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Appendix 
 
Some Questions Used from Enterprises and Entrepreneurs Survey: 
 
Montenegro 
 
Q1:  Can you please provide a close estimate of the amount of underreported 
business income (profits) earned by enterprises/entrepreneurs in your 
sector?  
 
Q2:  Some say that a percentage of employees working for enterprises such as 
yours, in the same sector, receive social security only on a portion of their 
wages and that the other portion on which the corresponding social secu-
rity is not paid, is received as an envelope wage. In your opinion, on 
which portion of the total salary, on average, are the corresponding taxes 
and social security not paid in enterprises such as yours?  
 
Q3:  Your estimates are extremely important to us. In your opinion, of the 
total number of employees working in enterprises in the same sector as 
yours (organisations, instititutions), what percentage of employees re-
ceive full social security, what percentage receive a fraction of these be-
nefits, and what percent do not receive any social security.  
 
Q4:  Should the enterprise be found guilty, what do you think is the probabil-
ity that the manager/entrepreneur will be penalised? The question in-
cludes a scale from 1 to 11 where 1 represents a probability of 0 and 11 
represents a probability of 100%.  
 
Q5:  What is your view regarding the justification of informal business in 
Montenegro? Please use the scale from 1 to 4, where 1 represents that 
this kind of business is never justified, and 4 represents that it is comple-
tely justified.  
 
Serbia 
 
Q6:  In your opinion, what percentage of employees in your sector of eco-
nomic activity are completely without contract, that is are unregistered? 
 
Q7:  In your opinion, what percentage of overall salaries in your sector of eco-
nomic activity are not paid through bank accounts (paid in cash)? 
 
Q8:  In your opinion, what percentage of turnover in your sector of economic 
activity is informal (taxes not paid)? 
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Q9:  If caught, what do you think the probability is that this company, that is 
its CEO/entrepreneur will be fined? The question includes a scale from 
1 to 11 where 1 represents a probability of 0 and 11 represents a 
probability of 100%. 
 
Q10:  What is your stand on the justification of informal activity in Serbia? 
Please use a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means that kind of activity is not at 
all justified and 5 that it is entirely justified. 
